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Abstract
Background: Previous smallpox ring vaccination models based on contact tracing over a network
suggest that ring vaccination would be effective, but have not explicitly included response logistics
and limited numbers of vaccinators.
Methods:  We developed a continuous-time stochastic simulation of smallpox transmission,
including network structure, post-exposure vaccination, vaccination of contacts of contacts, limited
response capacity, heterogeneity in symptoms and infectiousness, vaccination prior to the
discontinuation of routine vaccination, more rapid diagnosis due to public awareness, surveillance
of asymptomatic contacts, and isolation of cases.
Results: We found that even in cases of very rapidly spreading smallpox, ring vaccination (when
coupled with surveillance) is sufficient in most cases to eliminate smallpox quickly, assuming that
95% of household contacts are traced, 80% of workplace or social contacts are traced, and no
casual contacts are traced, and that in most cases the ability to trace 1–5 individuals per day per
index case is sufficient. If smallpox is assumed to be transmitted very quickly to contacts, it may at
times escape containment by ring vaccination, but could be controlled in these circumstances by
mass vaccination.
Conclusions: Small introductions of smallpox are likely to be easily contained by ring vaccination,
provided contact tracing is feasible. Uncertainties in the nature of bioterrorist smallpox
(infectiousness, vaccine efficacy) support continued planning for ring vaccination as well as mass
vaccination. If initiated, ring vaccination should be conducted without delays in vaccination, should
include contacts of contacts (whenever there is sufficient capacity) and should be accompanied by
increased public awareness and surveillance.
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Background
Concerns about intentional releases of smallpox have
prompted extensive preparations to improve our ability to
detect and respond to an outbreak of smallpox [1,3,4,2].
Many factors contribute to the public health challenge of
understanding and preparing for smallpox, including the
age and quality of epidemiological data on native small-
pox and the smallpox vaccine, the difficulty of extrapolat-
ing that data to our current populations, the possible
terrorist use of altered smallpox, our ignorance of terrorist
methods of release, and the relatively high risk of adverse
events caused by the smallpox vaccine.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
established ring vaccination (selective epidemiological
control [5]), a strategy in which contacts of cases are iden-
tified and vaccinated, as the preferred control measure in
the event of a smallpox outbreak (interim plan). The suc-
cessful use of ring vaccination during the smallpox eradi-
cation campaign and its logical emphasis of case-contacts
for immediate vaccination support its use (though the
attribution of the success of the eradication program to
ring vaccination has been challenged [6]). Health Officers
should initiate ring vaccination upon identification of the
first cases of smallpox. However, there are legitimate con-
cerns regarding the ability of public health practitioners to
mount a quick, comprehensive and successful ring vacci-
nation program, particularly in the face of a moderate-
sized or large smallpox outbreak. To guide preparation
efforts and inform incident decision-making, we attempt
to identify outbreak characteristics and response capaci-
ties that significantly impact the ability of ring vaccination
to control a smallpox outbreak and to determine whether
ring vaccination is useful in the presence of a mass vacci-
nation campaign. Our analysis uses a newly developed
mathematical model: a continuous-time, event-driven
network simulation model of smallpox ring vaccination.
Mathematical models can advance our understanding of
how a smallpox outbreak might progress. Several mathe-
matical and computer models address the question of
smallpox transmission [7-13]. The first model to appear
[8] concluded that ring vaccination would be effective,
but did not treat response logistics in detail; the model
was linear and did not treat the depletion of susceptibles
as the epidemic progressed (appropriate, however, for
assessing control early in an epidemic, when the number
infected is small compared to the number of susceptibles,
e.g. [14]). The innovative model by Kaplan et al. [9]
emphasized the importance of resource limitation and the
logistics of smallpox response, but assumed that full infec-
tiousness began before the onset of symptoms (and the
subsequent identification and removal), and did not sep-
arately monitor close epidemiological contacts of patients
(which are at greatest risk, but also easiest to find and vac-
cinate); the conclusions were highly critical of ring vacci-
nation. The model by Halloran et al. [11], a stochastic,
discrete-time network model omitted the explicit inclu-
sion of response logistics while otherwise used parameter
values similar to those in Kaplan et al. [9]; the inclusion
of residual immunity from individuals vaccinated prior to
the discontinuation of routine vaccination, however, led
to a more favorable view of ring vaccination. The model
by Bozzette et al. [12] assumed that ring vaccination
would reduce the number of transmissions and focused
on health care workers (but did not explicitly include the
network structure of the population nor the response
logistics of ring vaccination). The model by Eichner [15]
did not explicitly include the network structure of the
population nor the logistics of ring vaccination, but did
use parameters based on data from an outbreak in
Nigeria, and did distinguish close and casual contacts,
case isolation, and surveillance of contacts; it concluded
that case isolation and contact tracing could prevent the
spread of smallpox. Finally, the individual-based model
by Epstein et al. [16] presented scenarios illustrating cer-
tain alternatives to pure mass vaccination and ring vacci-
nation of contacts of cases in preventing smallpox
transmission in small populations of 800 individuals; this
model includes no homogeneity assumptions, but did
not analyze tracing of contacts of contacts.
Because none of the available models includes both net-
work structure (with explicit contact tracing) and response
logistics limited by the number of available disease con-
trol investigators [9], we included these features in a con-
tinuous-time event-driven network simulation model of
smallpox ring vaccination. Specifically, the model we
developed includes the following features:
Network structure
Smallpox was primarily a disease of close contact, espe-
cially household contacts [5]. Such contacts are both the
most important epidemiologically, and also the easiest to
identify.
Post-exposure vaccination
Some evidence suggests that vaccination soon after expo-
sure may lessen the severity of the resulting case of small-
pox or possibly prevent disease entirely [17-20].
Second ring
Ring vaccination may involve not only vaccinating con-
tacts of cases, but also contacts of contacts of cases [21,22]
– potentially allowing the public health authorities to
"outrun" the chain of transmission.
Response capacity
Limited case-finding and vaccination capabilities lead to
the possibility that it may be impossible to find newlyBMC Public Health 2004, 4:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/4/34
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exposed individuals and vaccinate them in time, resulting
in a "race to trace" [9].
Heterogeneity in natural history
Mild, ambulatory cases of smallpox may spread disease
because such cases may be harder to recognize.
Prior vaccination
Vaccination of individuals prior to the discontinuation of
routine vaccination may provide some, possibly consider-
able, protection against infection [11,23,24], although it
may also result in more mild cases which may be harder
to detect.
Public awareness
Public awareness may lead to more rapid detection of
cases.
We use this model to determine what factors promote or
hinder the success of ring vaccination during a smallpox
outbreak, and whether ring vaccination is useful in the
presence of a mass vaccination campaign. In particular,
the goal of this paper is to examine the control of small-
pox by contact tracing and ring vaccination using a net-
work model which includes response logistics [9].
Methods
Model structure
Natural history of smallpox
We briefly review relevant features of the natural history
and epidemiology of smallpox [17,25-27,8,28]. Follow-
ing infection by the variola virus, individuals exhibited an
incubation period of approximately 7–19 days with 10–
14 being most typical. Sudden onset of fever and malaise,
often with accompanying headache and backache, began
the initial (or pre-eruptive) phase of smallpox. After 2–3
(or perhaps 4) days, individuals with the most common
form, ordinary type smallpox, developed the characteris-
tic focal rash, preceded in many cases by oropharyngeal
lesions. In fatal cases of ordinary smallpox, death often
occurred between the tenth and sixteenth day of symp-
toms; among survivors, most scabs had separated by day
22–27 of illness [26].
The course of smallpox varied widely between individu-
als, and several different clinical classifications were devel-
oped [29-31,17,26]. Consideration of the clinical features
and severity of smallpox is important from the standpoint
of mathematical transmission modeling because (1) the
clinical features affect the ease of diagnosis (and thus of
case identification), (2) more severe forms of smallpox
may result in more transmission, (3) vaccinated individu-
als may develop less severe disease. We utilize a modified
or simplified version of the classification system devel-
oped by Rao [32,31,26]; for the mathematical model, we
will classify smallpox into five categories: early hemor-
rhagic, flat and late hemorrhagic, ordinary, modified, and
mild. However, the clinical features and severity of small-
pox in different populations may have been affected by
underlying host factors, differences in viral strains, or dif-
ferences in the infectious dose owing to different prevail-
ing modes of transmission, and thus robust and precise
quantitative estimates of the effects of (pre- or post-expo-
sure) vaccination on the resulting smallpox severity, or of
the infectivity differences between individuals exhibiting
different forms of smallpox, are not available. The signifi-
cance of such differences will be revealed through sensitiv-
ity analysis. Further details are given in Appendix 1 [see
Additional file: 1].
Vaccination with vaccinia virus provided substantial pro-
tection against infection. Dixon assessed the risk of infec-
tion for an individual successfully vaccinated 3 years prior
to exposure to be 0.1% the infection risk of an unvacci-
nated individual [17]. However, smallpox vaccination did
not always take when applied, and moreover, in many
instances, individuals who experienced a repeated vacci-
nation failure developed severe smallpox upon exposure.
The probability of a successful take depended on the vac-
cination method used; we assume that the take rate is
between 95% and 100% [22,28]. In addition to protec-
tion against infection, vaccination could in many cases
modify the course of infection and reduce the severity.
Vaccine protection waned over time, but individuals vac-
cinated 20 years prior to exposure were believed to still
have half the infection probability that an unvaccinated
person had [17], and to have some protection against the
most severe manifestations of smallpox. Dixon [17]
believed that vaccine protection had at least three compo-
nents, which decayed at different rates; for the purpose of
this paper, we will assume that the severity of smallpox in
previously any (recently or otherwise) vaccinated individ-
uals follows the same distribution as for the vaccinated
subjects seen in the case series observed by Rao in Madras
[26], except that anywhere from 0 to 5% of vaccinated
subjects develop smallpox too mild to diagnose without
special surveillance or awareness. Observe that the vacci-
nated cases studied by Rao were vaccinated (at some point
in their lives) before exposure, rather than after exposure
to smallpox.
Smallpox was largely a disease of close contacts
[17,26,33], spread primarily through face to face contact
with an infected person (or occasionally through contam-
inated clothing). Individuals in the incubation period of
smallpox were not infectious, and long term carriers did
not exist. Patients were believed to be infectious following
the development of oropharyngeal lesions, which could
precede the rash by 24 hours [26]. However, patients were
believed to be most infectious during the first week of theBMC Public Health 2004, 4:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/4/34
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rash [26]; Dixon (1962) believed that patients could be
infectious from the onset of acute viremia, but most evi-
dence suggested that little transmission occurred prior to
the development of the rash [26,33]. The more severe the
case, the more infectious they appeared to be [34]; mild
cases were believed to have very little infectiousness.
While scabs contained infectious material and patients
were considered to be infectious until the last scab fell off,
in practice patients were not highly infectious during the
scabbing phase. Importantly, patients who had been vac-
cinated were found to cause fewer secondary cases [34].
Very severe cases, such as hemorrhagic or flat smallpox,
occasionally resulted in considerable transmission, owing
to diagnostic difficulties; mild cases, in which the patient
remained ambulant during the course of the disease,
could cause considerable spread as well [35,36]. Within a
household or family dwelling, the secondary attack rate of
unvaccinated susceptibles depended on the time and
place, occasionally below 50% [29], but often approach-
ing 100% [37]. Drier conditions were often believed to
favor transmission [17,27], so that lower rates of trans-
mission derived from tropical regions may not be applica-
ble to the temperate zone [38]. The number of secondary
cases resulting from a given importation into Europe var-
ied widely [39], with most importations yielding few
cases, but with the occasional large outbreak being seen.
Mathematically, we represent the course of smallpox
according to Figure 1. We distinguish eight epidemiologi-
cally relevant states: (1) just following exposure, during
which time vaccination could afford complete protection
against disease, (2) a period of several days during which
vaccination will not prevent disease, but may still reduce
the severity of disease, (3) still prior to the development
of symptoms, but too late for vaccination, (4) the begin-
ning of the pre-eruptive period, during which the patient
exhibits fever, malaise, and possibly other symptoms, but
is not yet infectious, (5) a short period prior to the appear-
ance of the rash, during which the appearance of oropha-
ryngeal lesions will permit variola transmission, (6) the
first week of the rash, during which time the patient is
most infectious, (7) and (8), succeeding stages of the rash,
during which time the patient is less infectious. For each
of these states, we assume that conditional on surviving,
the waiting time until the next stage is chosen from a uni-
form distribution as indicated in Appendix 2 [see Addi-
tional file: 2], except that the incubation period (the time
from infection until Stage 4) is derived from estimates of
the incubation distribution of smallpox based on impor-
tation cases in Europe [26] (see Appendix 2 [see addi-
tional file 2] for details). We chose to sample from a
uniform distribution as a simple way to ensure a mini-
mum waiting time in each state; many alternatives to this
choice are possible.
Network structure
We simulate the transmission of smallpox on a "small-
worlds" network (highly clustered, but with short charac-
teristic path lengths) [40]. Specifically, we assume that
each person is located in a single household, and that the
transmission rates were greatest in the household. We also
assume that a fraction of the population are grouped into
workplace or social groups, in which transmission may
also occur, but with a lower rate per unit time than for
household contacts. Finally, we assume that with a still
smaller probability, any individual may transmit infec-
tion to any other individual in the population (casual
contacts).
In general, in a network-structured model, the number of
secondary cases caused by an index case in a completely
susceptible population is not a useful index of epidemic
potential [41,42] (for a simple example, see [43]), since
(for instance) an individual could infect everyone in his or
her household, and not cause a widespread epidemic
unless between-household transmission were sufficiently
frequent. Rather than constructing the appropriate gener-
alized basic reproduction number for our model (leading
to highly cumbersome expressions), we chose an alterna-
tive (ad hoc) index of epidemic potential. For any given
scenario of interest, we simulated the introduction of 10
index cases at random into a population of size 10000,
and operationally defined "containment" to occur when-
ever the final size of the epidemic was less than 500 cases
within 250 days (we showed, in the discussion of Figure
Smallpox stages used in the simulation model Figure 1
Smallpox stages used in the simulation model. Flat 
and ordinary smallpox rashes are indicated with more dots 
than modified and "mild" smallpox, suggesting potentially 
greater infectiousness. Hemorrhagic smallpox is indicated by 
horizontal line shading. Further details are provided in Table 
6.
Ordinary
Hemorrhagic
Flat
Modified
Mild
Incubation Period Symptomatic Uninfected Recovered
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
infectious
rash
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5A below, that in nearly all cases, the 250-day window dif-
fers very little from a 1000-day window). Because we sim-
ulate a disease with a finite duration on a finite and non-
renewing population, epidemic extinction always occurs
in finite time.
Medical and public health intervention
We assume that even in the absence of specific case inves-
tigations, the presence of smallpox symptoms will prompt
patients to be diagnosed; we assume, however, a higher
diagnosis rate for all forms of ordinary smallpox than for
the severe flat and hemorrhagic forms, or for the mildest
form. We assume that once an individual is diagnosed,
their household and workplace contacts are investigated
and detected with some probability; we assume that a
high fraction (such as 95%) of household contacts are
assumed to be traceable (see below). We assume that the
fraction of workplace/social contacts that are traceable is
less than the fraction of household contacts that are trace-
able; we assume that no casual contacts are traceable.
High contact-finding rates may be plausible; we examined
San Francisco Department of Public Health records of
contact investigations for meningococcal disease (like
smallpox, a potentially fatal disease for which rapid
intervention may prevent mortality and morbidity).
Records were available from December 2001 to April
2002; 13 such investigations during this period resulted in
identification of 62 household contacts, all of which were
contacted; out of 38 workplace/social contacts identified,
32 were contacted (84%).
In our model, we assume that identified asymptomatic
contacts are vaccinated, quarantined, and monitored for
symptom development, while symptomatic patients are
isolated and treated as necessary [9]; thus, the modeled
interventions include more than ring vaccination alone.
Finally, we include the possibility that all contacts (of
both symptomatic and asymptomatic) traced and the
same procedure applied, so that all contacts of contacts
would be investigated. We assume that uninfected or
asymptomatic individuals who are visited or traced indi-
viduals will be diagnosed more rapidly than if they had
not been traced; in fact, such individuals would be iso-
lated and would not be able to continue a chain of trans-
mission. We follow previous models [9] in assuming a
limited vaccination capability of Kr per day for ring vacci-
nation. We assumed one of two strategies for contact trac-
ing: (1) tracing only of direct contacts of diagnosed cases,
and (2) tracing of contacts of contacts of diagnosed cases
as well as direct contacts.
The contact structure of the network is illustrated in Figure
2. Observe that individuals b and c are household contacts
of individual a, so that if individual a were a smallpox
case, an attempt would be made to find and vaccinate
individuals b and c as household contacts of a case. If indi-
viduals a and b were both cases, then two attempts could
be made to find individual c. We have modeled the effect
of multiple contact-finding attempts conservatively in the
sense that if the first attempt to find an individual as a
household contact (of a case or of a contact) is determined
to fail, no further attempts will be made. This maintains
the failure rate of contact tracing (looked at from the
standpoint of finding individuals) even in large house-
holds. Similar considerations apply to workplace/social
groups.
Network structure Figure 2
Network structure shown for households (joined by thick 
lines) of size 3 and workplace/social groups of size 4 (joined 
by thin lines); a small portion of the network is shown. Indi-
vidual a has two household contacts (b and c), and three 
workplace/social contacts (d, e, and f). If individual a were a 
smallpox case, the household contacts would be at highest 
risk for acquiring smallpox, followed by workplace/social 
contacts; all individuals in the population are at a low risk of 
casual transmission from individual a. Case investigation of 
individual a would identify the direct contacts b-f with proba-
bilities that depend on whether the contact is household or 
workplace/social; if such individuals are identified, they will be 
vaccinated. If contacts of contacts are being traced, the inves-
tigation will subsequently identify individuals g-p.
a
b
c
d
e
f
i j
g h
kl
m n
o
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Analysis
We analyzed the model in three ways. First, we selected a
Latin Hypercube sample [44-46] of parameters chosen
uniformly from the parameter ranges given in Appendix 2
[see additional file 2], and simulated the transmission and
control of smallpox to determine which parameters were
most important for contact tracing and ring vaccination to
be effective. Second, we used the same Latin Hypercube
Sample of input parameters, but assumed that all disease
control efforts were inactive. We used these parameters to
simulate smallpox transmission, but then iteratively
selected transmission parameters so that (1) between 1%
and 10% of new infections resulted from casual (random)
transmission, and (2) each index case resulted in between
two and five secondary cases (thought to be plausible for
historic smallpox; [8] suggest three secondary cases). For
each of the resulting smallpox parameter sets using 100
stochastic simulations per set, we determined the daily
ring vaccination/case tracking capacity needed to contain
all simulated smallpox epidemics (i.e., keep the total
number of cases below 500 within 250 days). Third and
finally, we chose parameter values to yield an moderately
large smallpox epidemic (with each index case causing
approximately six secondary cases), and present illustra-
tive scenarios for ring vaccination. These scenarios are
intended to complement the simulations which were cal-
ibrated to historic smallpox, since the characteristics of
smallpox that may be used in a deliberate release are not
known. It is important to realize that in our model, the
case finding time determines the fraction of contacts that
will become infected, and that our model parameters have
been chosen to yield quite rapid transmission to close
contacts; in reality, much transmission of natural small-
pox occurred through "sickbed" routes which would not
occur in a modern setting [47], so that in this sense our
model errs considerably on the side of caution and
pessimism.
Results
Most important parameters (sensitivity analysis)
To determine which of the input parameters were most
important in determining the total number of smallpox
cases, we selected a Latin Hypercube sample of size 1000
from the input parameter ranges indicated in Appendix 2
[see additional file 2] and simulated the mean number of
cases within 250 days in a population of 10000. We then
computed the partial rank correlation coefficient [46]
(PRCC; see Appendix 2 [see additional file 2]) between
each input parameter and the number of smallpox cases;
when the PRCC is close to zero, the value of the parameter
has little relation to the simulation output; when the
PRCC is close to +1.0 or -1.0, the value of the parameter is
highly important in determining the simulation output.
Neglecting the number of index cases (which is directly
related to the number of new cases), those parameters
whose PRCC exceeds 0.1 are shown in Table 2. Most of
these parameters identified as important are related to the
density of available contacts (mean household size, prior
vaccination fraction, and protection due to prior vaccina-
tion) or the transmission rate and infectivity (including
the length of the pre-eruptive infectious period (stage 5 in
Figure 2)). Note, however, that the speed of ring vaccina-
tion (household tracing delay) and faster diagnosis due to
awareness of the outbreak are important parameters.
Additionally, the infectivity of mild cases appears as an
important parameter as well.
Illustrative scenarios
To explore factors which contribute to the success of ring
vaccination, we chose smallpox scenarios which resulted
in severe and fast-moving epidemics in the absence of dis-
ease control; these simulated epidemics are considerably
more severe than is believed likely under present
circumstances.
Effect of contact tracing and ring vaccination
We used these parameters to simulate smallpox epidemics
beginning with 10 cases, for a variety of levels of ring vac-
cination capacity per day (contact tracing capacity per
day), as shown in Figure 3A. In this Figure, we assume that
the population size is 10000, and that the epidemic began
with 10 infected individuals. The mean household size is
assumed to be 4, the mean size of the workplace/social
contact group is 8, and contacts of contacts are traced. We
assume that each day, the number of contacts that can be
traced and vaccinated as a result of case investigation is 0,
10, 20, 30 and 40 per day; the probability of finding a
workplace/social contact is assumed to be 80%. The Fig-
ure shows the average number of infected individuals
each day (based on 100 stochastic simulations) for each
of these scenarios. Selected parameter values are indicated
in the caption for Figure 3A and in Table 1.
Because we assumed nonzero diagnosis probabilities dur-
ing the prodromal period for all individuals in Figure 3A,
we repeated the simulation assuming no diagnosis in the
prodromal period unless individuals were under specific
surveillance. The results were nearly identical: assuming
30 contact tracings (ring vaccinations) per day, we found
26% of the scenarios in Figure 3A exhibited decontain-
ment, and 28% assuming no diagnosis during the prodro-
mal period; assuming 40 contact tracings per day, we
found 1 out of 100 scenarios showed loss of containment
in Figure 3A and when we repeated the scenario of Figure
3A assuming no diagnosis during the prodromal period.
In Figure 3B, we illustrate control of an epidemic for
which all parameters are identical to Figure 3A, except that
the workplace/social group size is 12 (instead of 8, as in
Figure 3A), and the probability of finding workplace/BMC Public Health 2004, 4:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/4/34
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social contacts is 60% (instead of 80%, as in Figure 3A).
In this case, the larger size of the workplace/social groups
and the lower contact finding probability makes it neces-
sary to have a higher ring vaccination capacity to attain a
high probability of containing the epidemic, and on aver-
age it takes longer for eradication to finally occur.
Finally, in Figure 3C, we show control of an epidemic in a
population of 100,000, beginning with 1000 initial infec-
tives, keeping all other parameters the same as in Figure
3A. Each curve corresponds to the indicated number of
possible ring vaccinations per day. This figure shows that
assuming sufficient capacity, ring vaccination is in princi-
ple capable of containing even epidemics beginning with
very many infected individuals. However, mass vaccina-
tion in such cases is justified because of the far larger
number of individuals at risk and the inability to perform
such extensive contact tracing.
In Figure 3D, we compare the effect of tracing contacts of
contacts (as described in Appendix 2 [see additional file
2]) at different levels of ring vaccination capacity. Thin
Table 1: Selected parameter values for Figure 3A and other illustrative scenarios. The notations "Other" or "Other factors" in the 
column "See also" refers to the text section "Other factors". The symbols are defined in Appendix 2 [see additional file 2] and are 
included for reference.
Description Values See also Symbol
Number of index cases 10–1000 Figure 3C A
Mean household size 4 H
Workplace/social group size 8 Figure 3B W
Ring vaccinations per day 0–200 Fig. 3A, 3B, Other Kr
Monitored diagnosis rate 1–8 day-1 Figure 5A, 5B φ
Prob. of finding household contact 0.95 Table 4 υ1
Prob. of finding workplace/social contact 0.8 Fig. 3B, 4AB; Tb. 4 υ2
Delay, tracing household contacts 1–5 days Figure 6 δ1
Delay, tracing workplace/social contacts 2–10 days Figure 6 δ2
Relative diagnosis rate after 1st diagnosed case 1.5 Figure 7 a1
Infectivity, stage 4 relative to stage 5 0.2 Figure 8 k
Infectivity, stage 5 relative to stage 6 0.2 Figure 8 k'
Infection hazard for close contacts 5 day-1 Table 3 λ
Relative hazard for workplace/social contacts 1/3 Table 3 h2
Casual transmission rate 0.15 day-1 β
Prior vaccination fraction 0.25 Other factors f
Fraction of mild cases 0.03 Other factors
Vaccine success rate (for very recent vaccination) 0.667 Other factors α1
Vaccine success rate (vaccination prior to discontinuation of routine vaccination) 0.5 Other factors α2
Vaccine success rate full protection 0.999 Other factors α3
Table 2: Most important parameters. PRCC: partial rank correlation coefficient (see Appendix 2 [see additional file 2] for definition and 
references).
Parameter PRCC
Mean Household Size 0.575
Transmission Rate from Close Contacts 0.520
Infectivity prior to rash 0.309
Ring Vaccination Capacity -0.296
Casual Transmission Probability 0.244
Pre-eruptive infectious period (lower bound) 0.224
Number of Casual Contacts per Day 0.210
Relative Infectiousness of Social/Workplace Contacts 0.200
Fraction of Individuals in Social/Workplace Groups 0.183
Faster Diagnosis due to Awareness of Outbreak -0.175
Household Tracing Delay 0.104
Pre-eruptive Diagnosis Probability -0.103
Diagnosis Probability after Rash -0.103BMC Public Health 2004, 4:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/4/34
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Expanding severe smallpox epidemic Figure 3
3A - Expanding severe smallpox epidemic beginning with 10 initial cases, assuming 0, 10, 20, 30, and 40 possible ring vac-
cinations per day. The household size is 4 and the workplace/social group size is 8; we assume 95% of household contacts are 
traceable (with a mean delay of 1 day) and 80% of workplace/social contacts are traceable (with a mean delay of 2 days). We 
also assume that 25% of the population have 50% protection from infection resulting from vaccination prior to the discontinu-
ation of routine vaccination. We assume that infection will be transmitted to close contacts with a mean time of 0.2 days, and 
that each person while infective causes on average 0.15 casual (untraceable) infections per day. We assume that individuals are 
20% as infectious in the day just before the appearance of the rash as they will be during the first week of the rash, and that 
individuals are 20% as infectious as this (4% as infectious as during the first week of the rash) during the prodromal period. We 
assume that diagnosis rates will increase by a factor of 50% after smallpox becomes known to the community; we assume that 
each individual contacted during an investigation has a additional diagnosis or removal rate of 0.75 per day following the onset 
of symptoms (reflecting enhanced surveillance or contact isolation). Important parameters are summarized in Table 1; the full 
set of parameter choices is outlined in Tables 8-11 in Appendix 2 [see additional file 2]. Diagnosis times are discussed in 
Appendix 2 [see additional file 2].
3B - An expanding severe smallpox epidemic under inadequate ring vaccination is shown for parameters identical 
to Figure 3A, except that workplace/social group sizes are 12 (instead of 8), and the probability of tracing workplace/social 
contacts is 0.6 (instead of 0.8).
3C - A severe smallpox epidemic is controlled by ring vaccination despite the large number of initial cases. The parame-
ters are identical to Figure 3A, except that 1000 index cases inaugurate the attack in these scenarios (and ring vaccination 
capacity is much greater, as indicated). While not recommended, ring vaccination may ultimately halt epidemics beginning with 
many index cases if sufficient vaccination capacity were available, contact finding feasible, and follow-up sufficient. 
3D - Tracing contacts of contacts (red) is beneficial when sufficient contact tracing/ring vaccination capacity exists (dotted 
lines). In these scenarios, all parameters are the same as in Figure 3A; the number of contact tracings possible per day is either 
20 or 40 per day. Contacts of contacts are traced in two scenarios; in the other two, only direct contacts of cases are traced. 
For low levels of ring vaccination (20 per day), tracing contacts of contacts is harmful; for high levels (40 per day) of ring vacci-
nation, it is beneficial to trace contacts of contacts. When the contact tracing/ring vaccination capacity is too small to ade-
quately cover contacts of the cases themselves, diversion of resources to contacts of contacts is harmful; however, provided 
that sufficient capacity exists, tracing contacts of contacts helps outrun the chain of transmission. Each line corresponds to the 
average of 100 realizations.
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lines in red correspond to the presence of tracing contacts
of contacts; thick lines in black correspond to tracing
direct contacts of cases only. Each simulation was
performed 100 times, with 10 initial infectives, and for 20
and 40 ring vaccinations possible per day (as indicated).
The average number infected on each day is plotted in the
Figure. The figure illustrates that when ring vaccination
capacity is low, tracing contacts of contacts (as modeled)
yields a more severe average epidemic; when ring vaccina-
tion capacity is large, tracing contacts of contacts results in
a less severe average epidemic; if the contact tracing/ring
vaccination capacity is too low to cover adequately the
contacts of contacts in addition to the contacts of cases,
extension of tracing to the contacts of contacts (the second
ring) is harmful; however, if there is sufficient capacity to
cover the contacts of contacts, then the tracing of contacts
of contacts is beneficial.
Finally, in Figure 4, we illustrate the considerable variabil-
ity that may be seen from simulation to simulation. This
figure shows twenty simulations when contacts of con-
tacts are not traced. Stochastic variability between realiza-
tions is considerable, even when all parameters are held
constant; this variability is expected to limit the ability to
make inferences based on observation of a single realiza-
tion of the process.
Because our baseline hazard for infection of individuals
may be larger than would be expected for naturally occur-
ring smallpox, we examined the effect of more realistic
values of this hazard. In particular, we chose different lev-
els of ring vaccination capacity (10, and 20), and of the
relative hazard for workplace/social contacts, and then
chose values of the baseline hazard for infection varying
from 0.5 per day (for a mean time to infection of 2 days)
to 2 per day (for a mean time to infection of one half day),
Table 3: Estimated decontainment probability   for different levels of ring vaccination capacity (Kr) and relative hazard for infection 
due to workplace/social contacts (h2), for different levels of the baseline hazard for infection from household contacts λ (based on 
replications of 100 simulations for each level). For each scenario, 10 index cases were introduced into a population of size 10000. All 
other parameters were the same as for Figure 3A. As before, we define decontainment to mean that the total number of cases from 
10 index cases eventually exceeded 500 by day 250.
Relative hazard for 
workplace
or social contacts
Ring vaccinations per day
10 20
λλ
1/3 0.5 0 0.5 0
0.75 0.02 0.75 0
1 0.26 1 0
1.25 0.73 1.25 0
1.5 0.96 1.5 0.02
2 1 2 0.16
λλ
2/3 0.5 0 0.5 0
0.75 0.46 0.75 0
1 0.82 1 0.02
1.25 1 1.25 0.11
1.5 1 1.5 0.26
2 1 2 0.49
λλ
10 . 5 0 . 1 4 0 . 5 0
0.75 0.86 0.75 0
1 0.99 1 0.07
1.25 1 1.25 0.22
1.5 1 1.5 0.49
2 1 2 0.85
ˆ PD
ˆ PD ˆ PD
ˆ PD ˆ PD
ˆ PD ˆ PDBMC Public Health 2004, 4:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/4/34
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and introduced 10 index cases into a population of
10000. We then repeated this 100 times, and reported the
fraction of scenarios in which the number of infections
ultimately exceeded 500 (as before, chosen as a cutoff to
indicate the ultimate "escape" of containment of the
epidemic). These results, shown in Table 3, support the
idea that ring vaccination can easily control introduced
smallpox provided there is sufficient capacity and efficacy
of tracing.
Because of considerable uncertainty in the model param-
eters, we chose a collection of parameter values, and for
each, estimated the containment probability (operation-
ally defined as fewer than 500 total cases as a result of 10
index cases, within 250 days). We estimated this contain-
ment probability by simulating the smallpox epidemic
100 times for the same parameter values, and computing
the frequency out of these 100 realizations for which
fewer than 500 index cases resulted within 250 days.
(Using a 1000 day window produces slightly smaller
containment estimates; for 3 out of 1000 parameter set
choices, this difference was greater than 0.06; the
maximum difference seen was 0.23; the mean absolute
difference was 0.0029; in only one case out of 1000 did
we see containment in all 100 cases for the 250-day win-
dow, but not in all 100 cases for the 1000-day window).
One thousand scenarios chosen from a Latin Hypercube
sample were analyzed, and as indicated before, we chose
the hazard for close contact transmission and the hazard
for random transmission to guarantee that between 2 and
5 secondary cases per case occur, and that no more than
5% of cases are attributable to random transmission (we
refer to this set as the "calibrated" scenarios further in this
text). Having chosen this collection of 1000 parameter
sets, we considered two levels of two different control
parameters which were applied to each (so that each of
the 1000 parameter sets were simulated under four differ-
ent control conditions). The first of the two control
parameters was the probability of workplace/social group
contact finding; we chose values of 0.8 and 0.9 for this
parameter (the household contact finding probability was
0.95 in all cases). The second of the control parameters
was the rate of diagnosis (and effective removal) from the
community of cases developing among previously identi-
fied and traced contacts who were initially asymptomatic
(we refer to this as the monitored diagnosis rate); we
assumed first a low level corresponding to a mean
diagnosis time of one day from the onset of symptoms,
and a high level corresponding to a mean time of 3 hours
from the onset of symptoms (high levels of the monitored
diagnosis rate correspond effectively to isolation of con-
tacts). Finally, we assumed a doubling of the diagnosis
rate after the beginning of widespread community aware-
ness of smallpox. We then computed the containment
fraction at different levels of ring vaccination capacity
(contact tracing capacity per day). Thus, for each of 1000
scenarios (parameter set choices), we assigned the
workplace/social group contact tracing success probability
(υ2), the monitored diagnosis rate φ (Appendix 2 [see
additional file 2]), and the contact tracing/ring vaccina-
tion capacity per day (Kr). We then performed 100 realiza-
tions beginning with 10 index cases, and computed the
containment fraction (fraction showing fewer than 500
cases in 250 days, beginning with 10 index cases). Thus,
for each of the two choices each of υ2 and φ, and for each
value of Kr we examined, we obtained 1000 values of the
containment fraction. We use the resulting distributions
in Figure 5A (averaging over these 1000 containment frac-
tions), and Figure 5B (displaying the minimum value of
the 1000 containment fractions).
In Figure 5A, we plot the mean containment fraction
(averaging the containment fraction over all 1000 scenar-
ios), as ring vaccination capacity varies, for the two levels
of workplace/social group contact finding probabilities
(0.8 and 0.9), and for the two levels of monitored diagno-
sis rate among initially asymptomatic contacts (1 day-1
and 8 day-1). For low levels of ring vaccination (traceable
contacts per day), the epidemic is almost never contained,
but for ring vaccination levels near 50–60 per day (5–6
per index case per day), the average containment fraction
Stochastic variability Figure 4
Stochastic variability is illustrated by plotting the number 
of infectives over time over multiple replications. In this 
example, most simulations exhibit rapid containment of 
smallpox. The mean number of cases (averaging over simula-
tions) is influenced by a small number of simulations exhibit-
ing an uncontained epidemic. The parameters are the same 
as in Figure 3A, except that contacts of contacts are not 
traced in these replications.
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The mean containment probability Figure 5
5A - The mean containment probability increases as the number of ring vaccinations per day is increased. For this figure, 
the 1000 "calibrated" parameter sets were chosen, and for each parameter set, 100 realizations were simulated and the frac-
tion of these for which the epidemic was contained to fewer than 500 cases was determined. The average of these 1000 con-
tainment fractions is plotted on the vertical axis. We assumed a household contact finding probability of 95% and that the 
diagnosis rates double after community awareness of the epidemic. We considered high levels of workplace/social (w/s) con-
tact finding (0.9), as well as moderate levels (0.8). We also considered two levels of diagnosis of smallpox among investigated 
(alerted) contacts: high levels (corresponding to a 3 hour mean delay, indicated by "high contact isolation"), and moderate lev-
els (corresponding to a one day delay, and indicated by "less contact isolation"). The figure shows four such conditions, a. high 
workplace/social contact finding probability and high contact isolation, b. moderate workplace/social contact finding probability 
and high contact isolation, c. high workplace/social contact finding probability and less contact isolation, and d. moderate work-
place/social contact finding probability and less contact isolation. All other parameter values were chosen from the uncertainty 
analysis (the 1000 "calibrated" parameter sets). In this figure, "contact isolation" refers to the monitored diagnosis rate, i.e. the 
rate at which previously asymptomatic contacts who subsequently develop disease will be diagnosed (φ, Table 1, Table 8).
5B - The minimum containment probability out of the same 1000 scenarios chosen in Figure 5A. Whereas in Figure 5A, 
we averaged the simulated containment frequency (out of 100 realizations for each scenario), in this figure we determined 
which of the 1000 scenarios led to the lowest containment frequency, and we plotted this single worst (out of 1000) contain-
ment frequency, at different levels of ring vaccination capacity, for the same four conditions as in Figure 5A: a. high workplace/
social contact finding probability (0.9) and high contact isolation (effective 3 hour delay following symptoms), b. moderate 
workplace/social contact finding probability (0.8) and high contact isolation, c. high workplace/social contact finding probability 
(0.9) and less contact isolation (effective one day delay), and d. moderate workplace/social contact finding probability (0.8) and 
less contact isolation. All parameters are the same as in Figure 5A (the household contact finding probability is 0.95 for all sce-
narios, and the diagnosis rates are doubled after the onset of community awareness). In this figure, "contact isolation" refers to 
the monitored diagnosis rate, i.e. the rate at which previously asymptomatic contacts who subsequently develop disease will be 
diagnosed (φ, Table 1, Table 8).
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became close to 1. However, this average conceals the fact
that for some scenarios (parameter sets chosen from the
calibrated uncertainty analysis), control remains difficult
or impossible even at high levels of ring vaccination.
Therefore, in Figure 5B, we plotted the single lowest con-
tainment fraction seen out of the 1000 computed;
focusing on the single worst scenarios reveals a different
picture, and shows that isolation of asymptomatic con-
tacts and very high probabilities of finding workplace or
social contacts would be needed to control smallpox
under these most pessimistic parameter choices.
Effect of contact tracing speed
Rapid contact tracing in ring vaccination may play an
important role in suppressing the epidemic, since the
longer it takes to trace a contact, the less likely the vaccine
is to be efficacious, and the more opportunities the
infected individual may have to transmit disease before
they are finally located, isolated, and vaccinated if appro-
priate. We illustrate this possibility in Figure 6 by
examining the same scenario we showed earlier in Figure
3A (e.g. households of size 4, workplace/social groups of
size 8, 95% of household contacts traceable, 80% of work-
place/social groups traceable, an average time to infection
for a household contact of an infective given by 0.2 days).
We assume in one case that contacts may be traced quickly
(1 day for a household contact, 2 days for a workplace/
social contact), and in the other that the contacts are on
average found slowly (5 days for a household contact, 10
days for workplace/social contacts); we assumed 30 ring
vaccinations (traceable contacts) possible per day. In this
scenario, the epidemic is more severe and containment
(as we have been defining it) less likely when contact trac-
ing is slow: in the fast scenario, 238 infections occurred on
average and the (estimated) containment probability was
99%; for the slow scenario, on average 3587 infections
occurred and the (estimated) containment probability
was only 1%.
While Figure 6 illustrates the possibility that rapid contact
tracing may be of decisive importance in some scenarios
(parameter set choices), this is not always the case. For
some parameter sets, the probability of tracing contacts
(household or workplace/social) may be too low, or the
transmission rate too high, for more rapid contact tracing
to make any difference. Conversely, for other parameter
sets, the smallpox transmission rate may be so low that
smallpox is easily contained even with slow contact trac-
ing. While rapid contact tracing is never harmful, overall,
how typical are the results of Figure 6 (in which rapid con-
tact tracing was important in ensuring the efficacy of ring
vaccination)? To address this question, we simulated the
growth of smallpox for the 1000 "calibrated" scenarios we
used in Figure 5A and 5B. As before, we assumed ten ini-
tial cases, and (as in Figure 6) that 30 ring vaccinations
were possible per day; then we simulated 100 epidemics
assuming one day to find a household contact (and 2 days
to find a workplace/social contact). We then simulated
100 epidemics assuming that it takes five days to find a
household contact and 10 days to find a workplace/social
contact (as in Figure 6). For each of these 1000 scenarios,
we calculated the fraction of simulations for which the
total number of cases is 500 or less within 250 days, i.e.
the containment fraction. For nearly all scenarios (param-
eter set choices), the containment fraction was smaller
(sometimes much smaller) when the contact finding time
is faster (since faster contact finding, all else being equal,
improves smallpox control, as illustrated in Figure 6).
However, for 64.5% of the scenarios (parameter set
choices) examined, the difference was less than 2.5% in
absolute terms (smallpox was either contained or not con-
tained depending on other factors, and rapid contact trac-
ing did not make the difference). On the other hand, for
18.7% of the scenarios examined, the absolute difference
in the containment probability was 20% or more; thus, a
substantial difference in containment probability is occa-
Faster contact tracing Figure 6
Faster contact tracing may improve the efficacy of ring 
vaccination. We assume the same baseline parameters as in 
Figure 3A (e.g. households of size 4, workplace/social groups 
of size 8, 95% of household contacts traceable, 80% of work-
place/social contacts traceable), and 30 ring vaccinations 
available per day (with contacts of contacts not traced). The 
fast scenario corresponds to an average one day delay for 
household and two days for workplace/social contacts (as in 
Figure 3A); the slow scenario corresponds to an average five 
day delay for household and ten day delay for workplace/
social contacts. This figure shows the average of one hundred 
realizations starting with ten index cases.
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sionally attributable to the difference between fast and
slow contact tracing.
Effect of more rapid diagnosis
Public awareness of smallpox, leading to more rapid iso-
lation and identification, may play an important role in
eliminating the epidemic, as illustrated by the scenarios in
Figure 7. We assumed 20 ring vaccinations possible per
day, a capacity too small to contain the epidemic in the
absence of increased surveillance or diagnosis; the black
line in the figure shows the steeply rising average number
of cases for the first 100 days. If, however, surveillance or
public awareness of the symptoms of smallpox increases
the diagnosis rate by 50% (multiplies the baseline diagno-
sis rates by 1.5), containment becomes possible (blue
line); with a doubling of the diagnosis rate (red line) the
peak number of cases is lower still. In these scenarios,
increased diagnostic rates markedly improve the ability of
ring vaccination to control the epidemic, this suggest that
any ring vaccination effort be accompanied by increased
public awareness and surveillance.
In many cases, however, more rapid diagnosis was not
required for ring vaccination to be effective. As before, we
simulated smallpox epidemics for each of 1000 calibrated
scenarios, performing 100 realizations each beginning
with 10 index cases, and computed the fraction of scenar-
ios for which the epidemic was always contained (as
defined earlier), assuming no change in diagnosis rates.
We assumed 80 ring vaccinators per day, contact finding
probabilities of 0.95 for households and 0.8 for work-
place/social contacts (as in Figure 3A). Under these
assumptions, for 83.4% of the scenarios, the epidemic
was contained within 500 total cases in each of the 100
realizations, even with no change in diagnosis rates.
Uncertainty analysis (using the 1000 calibrated scenarios,
and based on the fraction of 100 replications showing
decontainment) revealed the most important parameters
which predict the failure of ring vaccination without more
rapid diagnosis were the same as we found in the earlier
uncertainty analysis; a higher fraction vaccinated before
the epidemic, smaller households or workplace/social
groups, less transmissibility, lowered infectivity prior to
the rash, more rapid diagnosis, and a higher rate of diag-
nosis for alerted individuals all contribute to a greater
containment probability even without an overall increase
in the diagnosis rate.
Effect of continued surveillance of contacts
We have been assuming that whenever an individual is
contacted during an investigation, the individual will be
diagnosed more quickly should they subsequently
develop symptoms. When transmission is assumed to be
very rapid (smallpox is assumed to be highly contagious),
most individuals may already be infected when identified
through contact tracing from an infective. Using the
scenario we examined in Figure 3A, we see that continued
surveillance of contacts is an essential component of
effective ring vaccination designed to control rapidly
spreading smallpox: if smallpox in a contact is not diag-
nosed any more quickly than for a non-contact, contain-
ment by ring vaccination requires over 98% contact
finding probabilities for both household and workplace/
social contacts – even if unlimited numbers of ring vacci-
nators are available; containment cannot be guaranteed
by adding additional ring vaccination capacity if the con-
tact finding rates are too low and/or the follow-up for con-
tacts is insufficient. Smallpox which is transmitted less
rapidly to contacts would, however, be containable with a
lower contact finding probability (results not shown).
Finally, we used the "calibrated" scenarios (parameter set
choices) to explore the levels of contact finding
probability needed to contain the epidemic (as before,
defined to mean 500 or fewer cases ultimately resulting
from ten initial cases) (Table 4). In these scenarios, we
assumed that all traceable contacts were followed up very
More rapid diagnosis Figure 7
More rapid diagnosis due to public awareness or 
increased surveillance may lead to far more effective epi-
demic control. We assume the same baseline parameters as 
in Figure 3A, and averaged 100 realizations of the epidemic 
beginning with 10 index cases and assumed a ring vaccination 
capacity of 20 per day (and contacts of contacts not traced). 
For the black line, the diagnosis rate of cases does not change 
after the first case is identified (the multiplier is 1.0); for the 
blue line, the diagnosis rate increases by 50% (multiplier 1.5) 
after the first case is identified (as in Figure 3A), resulting in 
substantially fewer cases; and for the red line, the diagnosis 
rate is doubled (multiplier 2.0) after the first case is identi-
fied, resulting in still fewer cases.
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quickly (1/a = 1 hour, so that cases arising in previously
contacted persons almost never transmit the infection
further). We chose different levels of household and
workplace/social contact finding probabilities and differ-
ent levels of ring vaccination capacity, and performed 100
replications of each of the 1000 different scenarios. In
Table 4 we report the fraction of scenarios for which all
100 replications exhibited containment. Scenarios in
which smallpox is highly contagious require high contact
finding probability to ensure the containment of the
epidemic.
Transmission prior to rash
Transmission prior to the rash makes epidemic control
more difficult. In Figure 8, we show an expanding small-
pox epidemic assuming differing levels of infectivity prior
to the rash (adding increased infectivity prior to the rash,
keeping constant the infectivity after the rash). We assume
all parameters are the same as in Figure 3A (and that the
ring vaccination capacity is 40 per day). Infectivity prior to
the rash is modeled as the relative infectivity during the
short (1 day) period of oropharyngeal lesions just prior to
the rash (compared to the infectivity during the first week
of the rash), and as the relative infectivity during the pro-
dromal period (relative to the period just prior to the
rash). We consider three scenarios: a relative infectivity
during entire period is one (i.e., infectivity during the pro-
dromal period and just prior to the rash is the same as dur-
ing the first week of the rash), b the relative infectivity just
prior to the rash is the same as during the first week of the
rash, but during the prodromal period is 4% (as in Figure
3A) of this value, and c the relative infectivity just prior to
the rash is 20% of the infectivity during the first week of
the rash, and during the prodromal period is 20% of this
value. The figure shows that increased infectivity just prior
to the rash leads to a larger epidemic (comparing b and c);
in case b (high infectivity just prior to onset of rash), loss
of containment occurs 36% of the time (but in none of
the 100 realizations shown in case c (low infectivity prior
to rash)). Scenario a (full infectivity during entire the pro-
dromal period) showed loss of control in every realiza-
tion. Increasing the ring vaccination capacity from 40 per
day to 80 per day (results not shown) led to containment
in all of the realizations with high infectivity just prior to
the rash and low infectivity during the prodromal period
(case b), but made no difference if the infectivity was as
high during the prodromal period as during the rash (case
a). While intuitively adding additional infectiousness
must increase the number of secondary cases and make
control more difficult, these results do illustrate that even
a small amount of increased infectiousness prior to the
rash (when diagnosis is more difficult) may substantially
increase the difficulty of smallpox control.
Other factors
Finally, in Figure 9, we present scenarios in which each of
four other parameters are modified from the baseline
values of Figure 3A, assuming 40 contact tracings (ring
vaccinations) are possible per day (line a in the figure).
Specifically, we assume that severe smallpox
(hemorrhagic and flat) on average takes four times longer
to diagnose and isolate than ordinary smallpox (case b),
Table 4: Containment of severe smallpox at different levels of contact finding. The first three columns are assumed levels for the 
probability of finding a household contact, the probability of finding a workplace/social (W/S) contact, and for the number of contact 
tracings/ring vaccinations possible per day; the last two columns express (as percentages) the resulting probability of containment given 
the assumed contact finding probabilities and contact tracing capacities; two containment probabilities are given: the containment 
probability when only contacts of cases are traced (first column, "Contacts"), and the containment probability when contacts of 
contacts of cases are traced in addition to the contacts of cases (second column, "Contacts of Contacts"). All other parameters are the 
same as in Figure 3A.
Probability of finding Number of Ring vacc. per 
day
Containment Contacts Probability when Tracing 
Contacts of contacts
Household contacts W/S contacts
0.95 0.85 50 99.1% 97.9%
0.95 0.85 100 99.3% 100.0%
0.95 0.85 200 99.1% 100.0%
0.9 0.8 50 95.7% 95.8%
0.9 0.8 100 95.6% 99.9%
0.9 0.8 200 95.4% 100.0%
0.85 0.75 50 86.0% 93.3%
0.85 0.75 100 86.1% 99.1%
0.85 0.75 200 86.3% 99.2%
0.75 0.6 50 52.1% 72.0%
0.75 0.6 100 51.5% 78.5%
0.75 0.6 200 53.0% 78.6%BMC Public Health 2004, 4:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/4/34
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that no one in the population has prior vaccination pro-
tection (from before the discontinuation of routine vacci-
nation, case c), that 10% more smallpox is too mild to
diagnose (but still contagious, case d) compared to base-
line, and finally that the vaccine is completely ineffective
(case e). Each of these scenarios will be discussed further
below.
Scenario b was motivated by the possibility that individu-
als with severe forms of smallpox may be more difficult to
diagnose, and thus remain infectious in the community
longer (despite the much greater degree of illness of such
patients), or that such patients may be more infectious. In
this particular case, quadrupling the mean diagnosis time
led to one additional replication out of 100 in which
containment was not achieved (2/100, compared to the
baseline of 1/100). However, we assumed that commu-
nity awareness of smallpox leads to the same relative rate
of increased diagnosis among severe cases as for ordinary
cases, and that the most severe forms are relatively rare. In
addition to the scenario shown in the figure, we also
replicated the same 1000 "calibrated" simulations,
assuming that in each case 40 contact tracings per day are
possible and that the diagnosis time for severe cases was
four times that of ordinary cases. Finally, we repeated each
"calibrated" scenario 100 times assuming long diagnosis
times for severe cases, and not making this assumption,
and found that the difference in the decontainment frac-
tion was not large (results not shown).
Scenario c illustrates that vaccination prior to the discon-
tinuation of routine vaccination does play a role in small-
pox control by ring vaccination; there were more
decontainment scenarios (5/100) when no prior
Transmission prior to the rash Figure 8
Transmission prior to the rash makes epidemic control 
more difficult. The figure shows a expanding smallpox epi-
demic assuming differing levels of infectivity prior to the rash. 
We assume all parameters are the same as in Figure 3A (and 
that the ring vaccination capacity is 40 per day). Infectivity 
prior to the rash is modeled as the relative infectivity during 
the short (1 day) period of oropharyngeal lesions just prior 
to the rash (compared to the infectivity during the first week 
of the rash), and as the relative infectivity during the prodro-
mal period (relative to the period just prior to the rash). For 
scenario a, relative infectivity during the prodromal period 
and just prior to the rash is the same as during the first week 
of the rash, for scenario b, the relative infectivity just prior to 
the rash is the same as during the first week of the rash, but 
during the prodromal period is 4% (as in Figure 3A) of this 
value, and for scenario c, the relative infectivity just prior to 
the rash is 20% of the infectivity during the first week of the 
rash, and during the prodromal period is 20% of this value 
(these two parameters are the same as in Figure 3A).
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Additional scenarios, assuming 40 ring vaccinations or con- tact tracings possible per day, and that contacts of contacts  are traced; all parameters are identical to those in Figure 3A  unless otherwise indicated Figure 9
Additional scenarios, assuming 40 ring vaccinations or con-
tact tracings possible per day, and that contacts of contacts 
are traced; all parameters are identical to those in Figure 3A 
unless otherwise indicated. The figure shows the average of 
100 replications of five scenarios (Case a repeats the result 
from Figure 3A for reference); the numbers in parentheses in 
the legend are the corresponding fraction of the 100 scenar-
ios for which decontainment occurred. For case b, we 
assumed that flat and hemorrhagic smallpox cases took four 
times as long on average to diagnose as ordinary cases; for 
case c., we assumed that no one in the population had prior 
protection (as opposed to 25% for Figure 3A); for case d, we 
assumed that an additional 10% of individuals (13% instead of 
3%) would develop mild smallpox (with 75% developing ordi-
nary smallpox instead of 85% as in Figure 3A); and for case e, 
we assumed that the vaccine is completely ineffective and 
provides no protection against infection.
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protection exists in the population. The results suggest
that prior vaccination aids in the control of smallpox, but
that it is not strictly necessary for control (in this scenario,
95% of the replications exhibited containment). In Figure
3A, we assumed 25% of individuals had protection due to
vaccination prior to the discontinuation of routine vacci-
nation; in scenario c of Figure 9, we assumed this fraction
was zero.
Scenario d demonstrates that if 10% more smallpox infec-
tions (in absolute terms, i.e. 13% compared to 3% in Fig-
ure 3A) lead to mild cases among individuals with no
prior protection, the epidemic is more difficult to contain
(13/100 replications showed loss of containment).
Finally, scenario e demonstrates that containment is still
possible even when the vaccine is completely ineffective
in everyone – because of case isolation and isolation of
contacts (and of contacts of contacts). Here, with 40 con-
tact tracings possible per day, 55% of the replications
nevertheless exhibited containment even with a vaccine
which offered no protection whatever. With 90 contact
tracings possible per day, all replications exhibited con-
tainment even assuming no vaccine protection.
Effect of mass vaccination
Although less efficient than ring vaccination in the sense
that more vaccinations must be delivered to eliminate
infection, comprehensive mass vaccination following the
introduction of smallpox is sufficient to eliminate the
infection. In Figure 10, we show the probability of achiev-
ing containment (defined to be fewer than 500 total cases
resulting from 10 index cases) for different levels of ring
vaccination (0, 5, 10, and 20 vaccinations per day) and
mass vaccination (0, 0.5%, 1%, and 2%; compare with the
10%-20% per day many jurisdictions in the United States
are planning to vaccinate). Specifically, for each level of
ring vaccination and mass vaccination, we used the same
1000 parameter sets used in Figure 5, and performed 100
simulated epidemics for each parameter set. On the
vertical axis, we plot the fraction of the 1000 scenarios for
which each of the 100 simulated epidemics was con-
tained. We further computed the fraction of scenarios for
which none of the 100 simulated epidemics was con-
tained; this is indicated by the colored segment in the
small pie chart at each symbol. When the mass vaccina-
tion rate was 2% per day, the mean number of deaths
(averaging over all scenarios and all simulations within
each scenario) was 47.7, 33.7, 26.4, and 20.1 for a ring
vaccination level of 0, 5, 10, and 20 per day (respectively)
out of a population of 10000. Moreover, when we
increased the mass vaccination level to 3%, an average of
28.9 deaths occurred when no ring vaccination was used,
but this fell to 22.3 deaths when only 5 ring vaccinations
per day were available (again assuming a population of
10000, and 10 index cases). With a mass vaccination level
of 5% per day, an average of 18.8 deaths occurred without
ring vaccination, and 15.8 deaths occurred when only 5
ring vaccinations per day were possible. (At a mass vacci-
nation rate of 3% per day, containment as defined above
was achieved in all 100 replications for 95% of the scenar-
ios even without ring vaccination; at a mass vaccination
rate of 5% per day, containment was achieved in all repli-
cations for all scenarios.) These results show that over a
wide range of simulated epidemics, even seemingly small
levels of ring vaccination (coupled with follow-up) may
have a substantial effect in preventing epidemic spread
and reducing deaths from smallpox, even during a mass
vaccination campaign. Note that many jurisdictions in the
United States are planning mass vaccination campaigns
which could reach 10%-20% of the population per day,
far greater than the mass vaccination levels examined
here; it is interesting to note that mass vaccination cam-
Mass and ring vaccination Figure 10
Mass and ring vaccination together. Low-level mass vacci-
nation programs are improved substantially by the addition 
of ring vaccination. The shaded pie segments represent the 
fraction of 1000 scenarios for which containment (as defined 
in the text) was never realized; the vertical position of the 
pie chart represents the fraction of the 1000 "calibrated" sce-
narios for which containment was always achieved. As the 
fraction of the population mass vaccinated increases or the 
ring vaccination capacity increases, the probability of contain-
ment increases.
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paigns may be effective in preventing a widespread
epidemic even at much lower levels than are being
planned for. Where feasible, such rapid mass vaccination
rapidly eliminates smallpox transmission in our model;
vaccination of contacts is still beneficial, since we are
assuming that earlier vaccination yields a greater
probability of preventing or ameliorating infection
(results not shown).
Discussion
We constructed a simple network model of smallpox
transmission, and addressed the question of what circum-
stances contribute to the success of a ring vaccination
campaign designed to control smallpox. Our analysis
focused on the use of contact tracing/ring vaccination to
prevent a widespread epidemic following a deliberate
release.
We conducted a sensitivity analysis based on particular,
but reasonable, ranges for the unknown parameters. Our
results are consistent with prior vaccination models in
identifying prior vaccination and ring vaccination capac-
ity as significant factors in determining the spread of
smallpox. Unsurprisingly, we also find that household
size and ring vaccination speed are particularly important
parameters; these results are intuitively plausible. The
contact finding probability did not appear important in
this analysis only because a narrow range of values was
chosen.
We illustrated smallpox control by presenting scenarios
based on control of moderately severe smallpox epidem-
ics. We find that swift, aggressive contact tracing and ring
vaccination is is usually sufficient to bring the infection
under control. Provided that there is sufficient capacity,
vaccination of contacts of contacts is beneficial, and
results in fewer infected individuals and more rapid
elimination of infection; investigating contacts of contacts
allows the chain of transmission to be outrun to some
extent. When ring vaccination capacity is small, diversion
of crucial resources away from contacts is harmful; con-
tacts of contacts should only be traced and vaccinated pro-
vided that no resources are diverted away from contacts of
cases. The increased surveillance (or isolation) of contacts,
together with improved rates of diagnosis due to commu-
nity awareness, play important roles in smallpox control;
we note that in some cases, lowered diagnosis rates
among severe cases contributed to a small extent to loss of
epidemic control, and suggest that any public awareness
campaign include information to help the public be more
aware of the full spectrum of the clinical features of
smallpox.
One limitation of our analysis is that we chose not to
explicitly incorporate the specific epidemiology of health
care workers (or mortuary workers), who are likely to be
exposed to infected individuals during any smallpox epi-
demic (e.g. [17,22]), and who may then infect further
members of the community [22] (as was also seen in the
recent outbreak of SARS, e.g. [48]). Transmission to
health care workers may be considered to amplify the
initial attack or to be simply accounted among the expo-
sures we considered (and thus be approximated by the
behavior of our model), since health care workers and
their household contacts are in all likelihood traceable
contacts, and ring vaccination/contact tracing would iden-
tify and halt these chains of transmission as in our model.
The disruption of smallpox control and patient care that
may occur is not accounted for in our analysis, however,
causing our model in this sense to err on the side of opti-
mism. The appropriateness of pre-event vaccination of
health care workers or other first responders has been
addressed by other analyses [12,49], and is beyond the
scope of our model.
While we analyzed the effect of contact tracing, case and
contact isolation, and ring vaccination (together with
mass vaccination), in a real smallpox epidemic, in prac-
tice, control efforts are unlikely to be limited strictly to
vaccinating contacts (and health care workers, as likely
contacts) and isolating cases. Indeed, making vaccine
available to individuals who believe they live near cases or
to others on a voluntary basis occurred in smallpox con-
trol efforts in the past [22]. Vaccination of such individu-
als can only harm the disease control effort if it hinders or
delays the diagnosis of cases or the investigation and vac-
cination of contacts; our results show that even relatively
low levels of vaccination of the general population may
have a beneficial effect in preventing the epidemic from
escaping control.
More serious is the possibility that individuals who
should be vaccinated or isolated would be missed; this
could occur either because individuals or institutions did
not cooperate with the disease control effort, or because
the individuals simply could not be found. Our analysis
suggests that ring vaccination need not be perfect to
successfully contain the epidemic, and yet, under condi-
tions where there is a high rate of infection among con-
tacts, or a relatively high rate of casual transmission, high
rates of contact finding (in excess of 90%), together with
increased surveillance and contact isolation, are needed to
contain the epidemic.
Finally, the vaccination of individuals at low risk of con-
tracting smallpox will cause harm due to adverse events of
the vaccine; in our model, the assumed death rate due to
vaccination was small compared to the probability of
death from smallpox, and played essentially no role in the
analysis. In practice, individuals suspected to be at high-BMC Public Health 2004, 4:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/4/34
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risk for vaccine complications, but at relatively low risk for
contracting smallpox, might simply be isolated or closely
monitored even during an outbreak; while the presence of
individuals in the population at higher risk for vaccine
complications would increase the death rate during an
outbreak, such individuals are unlikely to impair the
containment of the epidemic (the primary focus of this
analysis).
Our results support ring vaccination against epidemics of
smallpox (even assuming high rates of transmission to
close contacts), but do note that stochastically, for severe
(rapidly transmissible) smallpox, scenarios of loss of con-
trol are seen, with resulting widespread epidemics. In sce-
narios in which the transmission potential of smallpox is
smaller, such loss-of-control scenarios occur less fre-
quently (results not shown). Mass vaccination campaigns,
when conducted quickly and with very high coverage, do
not result in loss of control in our model. Nevertheless,
fewer deaths due to smallpox result when ring vaccination
is conducted along with mass vaccination.
Conclusion
Simulated smallpox epidemics with ring vaccination sug-
gest that aggressive, fast ring vaccination can control epi-
demics of smallpox. To do so, however, smallpox must be
identified quickly and contacts vaccinated promptly. We
also identify public awareness of smallpox – leading to
prompt identification of cases – as a major factor in small-
pox control; in some simulations, it may play a role as sig-
nificant as ring vaccination itself [15]. However, we also
found that uncertainty in (1) transmission from mild
cases, (2) the household size, and (3) casual transmission
contributed to the overall uncertainty in the epidemic
size. Other parameters to which the number of infections
were highly sensitive were the prior vaccination fraction,
parameters related to infectiousness, and parameters
related to transmission prior to the rash.
Because our model combines network structure with
response logistics, our results support and complement
the results of other investigators. Our results support the
notion that prior vaccine protection may play an impor-
tant role in slowing the epidemic [11], despite the possi-
bility that some vaccinated individuals may develop mild
cases which are harder to identify, but which nevertheless
transmit disease. Likewise, our results provide support for
the view that ring vaccination should play a central part in
smallpox control. If initiated, ring vaccination should be
conducted without delays in vaccination, should include
contacts of contacts (whenever there is sufficient capacity
to cover all contacts of cases), and should be accompanied
by a vigorous campaign of public awareness which can
facilitate more rapid identification and isolation of cases. We
assumed that ring vaccination could be fast (little delay
between identification of a case and vaccination of the
contacts), effective (nearly all household contacts can be
found, and most of workplace and social contacts), and
available (there is sufficient capacity). To be effective, ring
vaccination planning must yield a system capable of meet-
ing these benchmarks; we should not only be able to
assess the number of contact vaccinations that will be pos-
sible per day, but should have a plan in place to (1) iden-
tify contacts by working with individuals, employers,
schools, community representatives, and authorities or
businesses who may have access to information facilitat-
ing contact tracing, (2) rapidly investigate and vaccinate
such individuals, perhaps using field teams managed by
central dispatch. It is important to realize that for high-
risk, transient, or unstably housed populations where
reliable contact tracing is impossible, the conclusions of
the model we present cannot be applied. It is important to
note that while our model suggests that ring vaccination
together with contact tracing and isolation is likely to be
successful, we found that for some scenarios (where
smallpox was more transmissible, or was relatively more
transmissible before the rash), epidemic containment
required not only ring vaccination, but increased public
awareness, the isolation of contacts, and tracing of con-
tacts of contacts. For scenarios in which the smallpox was
less transmissible, epidemic containment was possible at
lower contact finding probabilities. Thus, while our simu-
lations suggest that contact tracing/ring vaccination need
not be perfect to succeed, because of uncertainties in our
knowledge of the behavior of bioterrorist smallpox, it is
impossible to know in advance how good it will have to
be. Thus, that high contact finding rates, mass public
awareness leading to early identification of cases,
isolation of contacts, and investigation of contacts of con-
tacts should all be conducted with maximum effectiveness
to reduce the probability of a widespread epidemic.
While the possibility of smallpox uncontrollable by ring
vaccination has made mass vaccination preparations wise,
and while mass vaccination may be unavoidable in the
event of a deliberate release of smallpox, we believe that
ring vaccination is essential in any case. This is not only
because individuals recently exposed to smallpox may be
protected if they are vaccinated promptly, but because
each contact identified potentially lies in the immediate
future of the transmission chain. From the standpoint of
epidemic control, it is far more valuable to vaccinate indi-
viduals next in the transmission chain than to vaccinate
other persons. Our results support the idea that ring vac-
cination/case isolation may in many, if not most cases,
eliminate smallpox even without mass vaccination, but
also support planning for mass vaccination (so that the
vastly more costly and difficult policy of mass vaccination
will be available in the event of an explosive epidemic).
When faced with the unknown, multiple redundant prep-BMC Public Health 2004, 4:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/4/34
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arations are appropriate; case investigation/isolation may
control smallpox even if the vaccine does not work at all,
but mass vaccination is useful in the event of an explosive
epidemic for which case tracking becomes impossible.
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